In Roberts v. City of Phoenix, 2010 WL 2620802 (Ariz.App.2010) the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld a trial court order striking the defendant's answer and entering default judgment for repeatedly and continuously violating discovery obligations by failing to produce responsive documents. 

The plaintiff alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation against a city police officer.  In the initial stages of litigation, the defendant, the City of Phoenix, withheld two citizen complaints against the same police officer for the same type of discrimination.  Despite warnings from the trial court, the City of Phoenix selectively limited its disclosures and produced relevant documents only after the plaintiff learned of them and filed motions to compel.  In one instance, the City of Phoenix was asked to produce all files pertaining to the officer in question in non-redacted form and instead produced only a redacted personnel file.  When asked to produce all documents relating to the officer, regardless of significance, the City still failed to produce eighteen documents identified by the plaintiff and could not specify why certain documents had been purged during the pending litigation by the City and the police officer himself. 

In reviewing the appropriateness of default judgment as a sanction, the court noted that the City's discovery violations were "made in bad faith and for the purpose of obstructing discovery."  Id. at 17.  Based on trial court findings that the City had purposefully stonewalled the case by refusing to produce documents and not producing documents until opposing counsel discovered that the documents existed, the Court found reasonable grounds to support striking the City's answer and entering default.  The Court did not find lesser sanctions more appropriate since the trial court initially refused to strike the City's answer and ordered compliance with discovery obligations several times instead.  In addition, the Court held that default judgment as a sanction was "a decision on the merits," and accordingly, the trial court's award of attorneys' fees was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 24.

For a copy of the opinion, click here.